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From Discounting to Incorporating
Decisions' Long-Term Impacts*
Elizabeth Atherton**

The debate over how to value the future has been raging for years.
Philosophers have argued about our obligations to future generations
from several view points: that we owe them everything and that we owe
them nothing. At the same time, psychologists have conducted
countless laboratory experiments to determine "how" people act and
observed real situations to discover peoples' attitude about the future.
Economists and proponents of "rational decision theories" have argued
for constant discount rates and consistent, logical actions. So, how
"should" we value the future? At the moment, most decisions are made
by using constant discounting. This gives more weight to the present
than to the future; but, is using constant discounting justifiable for long
term policies? This paper will examine and contrast some of these
arguments and describe new way of valuing the future and structuring
the issues.
Philosophical Debates
Valuing the long term future requires us to think about our
obligations to future generations and look at how our actions affect
them. Many different views relate to this topic and philosophers have
passionately argued for each one. Routley and Routley outline some of
1
the most popular views:
0 Every person should be given the same value
independent of whether they live now or in the future;
*
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1 See Richard Routley & Val Routley, Nuclear Power Some Ethical and
Social Dimensions, in And Justice For All: New Introductory Essays in Ethics and
Public Policy, 116 (Tom Reagan et al. eds., 1982).
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* We have some obligation to future generations, but
much less than to those living now;
* We have obligations to the next generation, but none
beyond that; and
* We have no responsibility towards future generations.
The obligations we think we have to future generations determine
how we value the future and whether we discount it. Discounting often
covers three issues:
" How to value the future;
* How to value future money streams; and
* How to value the negative impacts of decisions, i.e.,
pollution.
Decision makers' opinions on these issues help to determine the
discount rate used and it is often important to analyze each of the issues
separately. Two important aspects that also need to be considered
involve:
* The ethics of the decision, the rights and wrongs of
devaluing future generations; and
* The effect of the discount rate on the efficiency of the
option chosen.
Some argue that high discount rates are unethical because they give
a low value to the future; 2 while others have argued that low discount
3
rates can result in the adoption of inefficient projects.
Goodin expresses very strong views against devaluing the future and
states that "future generations.., are being deprived insofar as, when
making decisions, we weigh their interests less heavily than our own.
And their deprivation is unjustifiable because the arguments offered in
defence of this practice fail in various ways." 4 Bickner says that
discounting amounts to saying "the hell with the values of a generation
yet unborn, or at least ten percent the hell per annum." 5 Goodin
claims that discounting shows favoritism to some generations, which
means treating people unequally and, therefore, works against general
public policy. 6 Kavka comments that "[l]ocation in space is not a
2 See Robert Goodin, Uncertainty as an Excuse for Cheating our Children: The
Case of Nuclear Waste, 10 Pol'y Sci. 25 (1978).
3 See Emmett Keeler & Shan Cretin, Discounting of Life-Saving and Other Non
Monetary Effects, 29 Mgmt. Sci. 300 (1983).
4 Goodin, supra note 2 at 27.
5 Robert E. Bickner, Pitfalls in the Analysis of Costs, in Pitfalls of Analysis 57, 68
(Giandomenico Majone & Edward S. Quade eds., 1980).
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morally relevant feature of a person determining his worthiness for
7
consideration or aid. Why should location in time be any different?"
Philosophers and economists have put forward many arguments as
to why we have some or no obligations to future generations. In the
following sections, I discuss several of these arguments and examine
their validity.
Economic Posterity

Some people claim that future generations will be better off
economically and, therefore able to deal with any problems that we
leave them. 8 This argument assumes that money or technology can
replace everything. In reality, this is not true. Goodin discredits the idea
of using technological advances to solve the problems we make. 9 He
notes that such advances remain uncertain and, at most, will help
decrease the effects of the bad outcomes we create. It is, therefore,
unrealistic to rely on technological advances too heavily.
Economists have argued that people will exhibit decreasing
marginal utility over time. If a country's economy continues to grow,
then the benefit people will receive from an extra unit of a commodity
in the future will be less than the benefit they would experience today.
This is because people will be better off in the future. Therefore, an
increase in the goods they have will be less important because they will
have decreasing marginal utility. For example, say you have no shoes,
then the first pair of shoes you receive will be worth a great deal to you,
but the second pair of shoes will be worth less to you because you
already have a pair, and so on. Each consecutive pair of shoes is worth
less to you and its value to you will not be as high as the first pair you
received.
Decreasing marginal utility is sometimes used as a reason for
discounting, but this assumes increases in per capita income. We cannot
guarantee that per capita income will increase over time. In some cases,
interest rates can be negative; therefore, future outcomes are worth
6

See Robert Goodin, Discounting Discounting,2 J. of Pub. Pol'y 53 (1982).

7

Gregory Kavka, The Futurity Problem, in Obligations to Future Generations

186, 188 (Brian Barry & R.I. Sikora eds., 1978).

8

See Keeler & Cretin, supra note 3.

9

See Goodin, supra note 2.
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more than immediate ones. If per capita income was increasing, it
would have to increase at a constant rate per year to justify a geometric
discount function.
In some cases, people cannot be compensated for the loss of a good
by an increase in the amount of the other goods they possess. When this
is true, only an increase in the actual good will give them decreasing
marginal utility with respect to that good. An increase in the economy
and wealth of a population cannot be used to justify discounting a nontradable good on the grounds of decreasing marginal utility. 10 The
discount rate of the non-tradable good will depend on how much more
of that good a person will have in the future. It will reflect the rate of
return of investment on that good, or its accumulation over time. The
availability of some non-tradable goods, i.e., the environment, may be
decreasing. Therefore, their marginal utility will actually be increasing,
so that their value in the future should also increase. These are all
arguments against using economic posterity and decreasing marginal
utility to justify discounting goods.
Opportunity Costs
Sometimes the discount rate applied to a project is calculated from
the opportunity cost of using the resources in the project. The
opportunity cost is the potential rate of return that could have been
gained from alternative uses of the resources. In the case of money this
would be the interest it could have earned had it been invested. The
fact that money invested now will grow in the future, due to interest
rates, is sometimes used to justify discounting the future. A pound
tomorrow is worth less than a pound today because today's pound
could be invested and earn interest.
Instead of spending money today to avoid harming future
generations or to protect them, money could be invested now so that it
will be available in the future for future generations to spend. It could
be argued that future generations will have a better idea of what to
spend their money on and that we should leave them the money to deal
with their own problems in a manner they think best. It would only be
10 Non-tradable goods are goods that cannot be directly exchanged for other
goods. For example, health cannot be exchanged for money. It is possible to buy
health care, but this does not lead to a definite increase in the amount of health
someone possesses.
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efficient to do this if less money needs to be invested now to
compensate future generations (after it has earned interest) than is
required now to prevent the problem. This would involve setting up a
trust fund and investing the money, so that it would accumulate and be
available to compensate future generations.
This idea presents many difficulties. How the trust fund should be
set up and maintained are difficult questions. Is it possible to guarantee
a constant interest rate to justify a constant discount rate? Trying to
prove a constant opportunity cost across all periods is not easy. Inflation
changes over time, as do interest rates. Banks can no longer be viewed as
stable institutions, as the Baring's case. 1 1 A more recent example is the
collapse of the banks in Russia and parts of Asia. Thus, it is not possible
to guarantee that money invested will increase in value in the long term.
The consequences of the decisions being considered span hundreds of
years; therefore, it will be almost impossible to guarantee a constant
interest rate over the lifetime of the outcomes. This makes it
unreasonable to use a constant discount rate. It is also impossible to
estimate exactly how much it would cost future generations to reverse
any negative consequences caused by our actions. Hence, it is hard to
know how much we need to invest now to enable them to cope with the
troubles they inherit. Therefore, it is problematic to compare prevention
costs with abatement costs in the future.
Not all damages can be converted into monetary equivalents, and
many valuable items, i.e., health, cannot be replaced by money. Setting
up a trust fund will not enable us to compensate future generations for
all of their losses or to rectify all the problems we leave them. The fact
that not all goods are tradable invalidates one of the main assumptions
of this justification of discounting and discredits the theory. The
opportunity cost argument is valid only when we are can convert all
goods into their monetary equivalents and can determine the interest
rate lost.
Goods could be traded for more of the same good. This applies to
any interest bearing resource, that is, one that will increase in magnitude
if it is not consumed now. Money spent now on lifesaving could instead
11

On February 26, 1995, Barings PLC, the oldest and arguably the most

distinguished investment bank in England, collapsed after sustaining a loss of
approximately $950 million on futures and options trading.
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be spent on research, which might save more lives in the future. In this
way, lives now could be traded for lives in the future. The opportunity
cost would be the extra number of lives saved in the future by doing the
research. This does not tell us whether it is acceptable to trade lives or at
what rate we should trade lives now for lives in the future. All it tells us
is that if there are two future projects available, the one that gives the
best rate of return on lives saved is better. It does not say how to
compare the present and the future. These ideas enable us to calculate
the opportunity cost for a good and, thus, determine its discount rate,
but it is debatable whether this would be an appropriate rate or not. 12
The theory is limited; it only applies to "interest bearing" goods,
and not all non-market goods are "interest bearing." 13 For example,
plans to protect the environment do not give an increase in the amount
of environment available, they just change the rate at which it is
degraded. If the amount of a non-market good available will decrease
in the future, then the opportunity cost argument states that we should
use a negative discount rate, as the good will be more valuable in the
future.
Uncertainty of the Future
The future is uncertain. We know that forecasting techniques are
only reliable in the short term, which gives us limited ability to predict
the future. The long term future is more uncertain than the present and
immediate future, therefore, some people claim that we should
disregard it. 14 In reality, the probabilities of outcomes do not become
much more uncertain as we progress into the future. Where risks are
involved, it is often the fact that there is the possibility of a risk that is
important and not the size of the probability.
Williams looks at the following two types of uncertainty: 15
* People may die before receiving the utility; and
* The utility may not be available in the future.
12 See Goodin, supra note 6 for further discussions.
13 Non-market goods are goods that are not traded on an open market and so do
not have a clearly defined monetary value.
14 See John Passmore, Mans Responsibility for Nature (1974); see also Charles
Hitch & Roland McKean, The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age (1960).
15 See Mary B. Williams, Discounting Versus Maximum Sustainable Yield, in
Obligations to Future Generations 169 (Brian Barry & R.I. Sikora eds., 1978).
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Although these uncertainties may apply on an individual basis and
therefore give a reason for discounting the future, on a societal basis
they are invalid. It is very unlikely that the whole of the human race will
be wiped out in the near future. Williams argues that the best chance of
survival is to maximize available resources, which means valuing the
future and preserving resources. 16 She shows that the possibility of
extinction means that it is not utility-maximizing for society to
discount the future. It has been argued that we are unsure of the utility
of future generations, while we are sure of our utility. However,
Williams says that the uncertainty involved works both ways and that
we are equally uncertain about how much future generations may
depend on resources we currently do not depend on. Therefore, we
should act cautiously with the world's resources.
The relationship between time and uncertainty will vary for
different goods over different time periods. Some uncertainty may not
increase over time and we may actually be more certain about some
issues in the future. Even if uncertainty does increase over time, and this
is why we are discounting, it would have to increase at a fixed rate per
year to justify geometric discounting.
Moore and Smart argue that future negative outcomes will be small
and, therefore, negligible. 1 7 They claim that the future can be
discounted because the good and bad outcomes will cancel each other
out. However, Goodin believes that there is an asymmetry in the
outcomes of events. 18 The bad outcomes of decisions are often far
worse than the good, so much so that they do not balance out.
Therefore, he reasons that it is unjust and even irrational to ignore or
discount future outcomes because of the gravity of their effects.
Indeterminacy
Golding has argued that we only have obligations to future
generations if we can reliably predict their needs. 19 He claims that
because we do not have reliable information about people living in the
16 See id.
17 See George Edward Moore, Principia Ethica 152 (1971); see also J.J.C. Smart,
An Outline of a System of UtilitarianEthics, in Utilitarianism: For and Against 3
(1973).
18 See Goodin, supra note 2.
19 See Martin Golding, Obligations to Future Generations, 56 Monist 97 (1972).
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future, we have no obligations to them. We cannot accurately
determine the effects of our actions will have the needs of future
generations, but we do know that there is a risk of adverse effects.
Decisions made about the present often account for risks with very
small probabilities. The fact that there is a risk matters in that decision
making process. There is no obvious reason why we should deal with
the future in a different way. It is easy to see that future generations will
still need a healthy earth and will not benefit from an increased risk of
illness. We, therefore, have an obligation to ensure that these things are
available. To say that we are very uncertain about the needs of future
generations is to give a high probability to the idea of their world being
dramatically different from ours, which is in itself unrealistic.
Baier also argues that many of the "wrongs" that we do to future
generations depend only on human nature and not on people's special
needs. 2 0 She claims that we know that future human beings will need
air, water, food, and that their lives will be harmed by poison and
toxins. Therefore, we should try to preserve and reduce these things
21
respectively. Goodin and Kavka make the same point.
UnequalDistributionofBenefits and Costs

In many long term decision situations, the current generation
receives the benefits, while the future generations incur the costs.
Nuclear energy illustrates this point. Current generations benefit from
the electricity that it produces, but future generations are left with the
waste. Cost benefit analysis using discounting can be used to justify
strategies with short term benefits and long term costs because the
future is discounted. This gives the costs much less value. Even in the
present generation, risks are not always equally distributed. This usually
results in public outcry and some sort of compensation, which is what
"should" happen with regards to future people. Unfortunately, future
generations are unable to argue about why they should be given equal
value. If we think in terms of compensation, it may actually be more
equitable to give future generations more weight in our cost benefit
analysis, as they will suffer involuntarily from our acts.
20 See Annette Baler, For the Sake of Future Generations, in Earthbound: Introductory Essays in Environmental Ethics 214 (Tom Regan ed., 1984).
21 See Goodin, supra note 2; see also Kavka, supra note 7.
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Non-Market Goods
The issue of discounting often depends on the object being
discounted. Discounting money is usually accepted, though if the
monetary sums equal a significant proportion of GDP, one might argue
against it. In Belarus, the consequences of Chernobyl are claimed to
cost on average 10-20% GDP per annum, therefore, discounting may
not be appropriate.
To make judgments on the marginal cost per unit dose of radiation
averted by countermeasures after a nuclear accident, decision makers
use a reference value for the cost of the man-Sievert. 2 2 This value is
called a and creates an equivalence relationship between money and
dose. Through 0x, units of dose equal money, discounting money is
equivalent to discounting dose, which may occasionally be accepted. By
the linearity hypothesis, dose is equivalent to expected number of years
of life expectancy lost. 2 3 Discounting may be acceptable because
individuals do discount the last years of their lives by smoking, for
example. However, not everyone will be comfortable with this idea and
if life expectancy is reduced by a large amount, people may be even
more averse to discounting. The linearity hypothesis also means that
dose equals number of deaths, and as society dislikes discounting lives,
this is unlikely to be acceptable to decision makers. Dose also equals
number of genetic defects. It is doubtful whether society would
discount these, unless there is a guarantee of medical advances.
This leads to the conclusion that, in decisions concerning radiation,
discounting money has the effect of discounting many other factors
because of the use of a and the linearity hypothesis. These result in
discounting being inapplicable to radiation decisions because long term
consequences reach into future generations. This is true in this particular
case because there is a way of putting a monetary value on lives.
22 Dose is a generic term for the quantity of radiation that impacts or is absorbed by

an individual. Its scale is such that under the linearity hypothesis the value is directly
related to the increased risk of cancer the individual faces from the exposure. See S.
French et al., Event Conditional Attribute Modelling in Decision Making When

There is a Threat of a Nuclear Accident, in The Practice of Bayesian Analysis 131
(Simon French & Jim Smith eds., 1997) and NRBP, Living With Radiation (1989).

A man-Sievert is the amount of radiation expected to increase the chance of cancer by
5%. That is, 20 man-Sieverts would result in an extra cancer in the population.
23 Research has shown that there is a linear relationship between the dose received
and the increased risk of cancer, the expected loss in life expectancy and the number
of deaths and genetic defects from the exposure to radiation.
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The public does not feel comfortable discounting certain
commodities. For example, why should the environmental welfare of
an area be valued less in the future than it is now? If there is
environmental degradation elsewhere, a particular area may actually
become more valuable. With some commodities, it will be impossible
to compensate future generations with money or technology if it is lost.
If this is true, then the commodity cannot be traded for money, and in
this case, it should not be treated or discounted in the same way.
The Same Rate ForAll Goods Every Year
If, despite all the arguments against discounting, decision makers
decide to value the future less than the present, why should the value
decrease geometrically? Parfit comments that the moral importance of
future events does not decrease at n percent per year. 24 Psychological
studies show that people do not generally exhibit constant discount
rates over time and often have different discount rates for different
commodities. The argument for discounting all goods at the same rate
depends on the assumption that they are all tradable, i.e., lives can be
completely replaced by money. In reality, this is rarely true. If
commodities are not completely interchangeable, then there is no
reason to discount them at the same rates. Okun and Goodin argue
these points. 2 5 They note that only goods which are completely
tradable should be discounted at the same rate. In this case, the rate to
use is the highest growth rate of the interchangeable commodities. For
non-market goods, the discount rate should be the rate at which they
accumulate over time. This would result in different commodities
having different discount rates.
If we have the same discount rate for both a good and money, over
time this implies that the future relationship between the value of the
good and money is constant. In reality, the relationships between goods
and money depend on whether the wealth of the society and the
availability of the good is increasing or decreasing. Schieber, Poullier,
and Viscusi found that as a country's wealth increased, it spent more on
health care. 26 This suggests that the monetary value of health care is
24 See Derek Parfit, An Attack on the Social Discount Rate, 1 QQ - Report
from the Centre for Philosophy and Public Policy 8 (1981).
25 See Arthur Okun, Equality and Efficiency (1975); see also Goodin, supra note
6.
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not constant but can vary as a function of GNP. Therefore, to justify
keeping the discount rates of health and money equal, we would have
to show that the relationship between them remains constant over time.
Similarly, the relationship between the environment and money will
probably change over time. As environmental commodities become
rarer or polluted, their value will increase. There does not seem to be
any evidence to back up the assumption that the relationship between
money and other commodities remains constant over time. Thus, there
seems to be no reason for discounting all goods at the same rate over
time. Nijkamp et al. also point out that discounting a non-monetary
good is only justifiable if there is evidence to show that the price level is
27
a constant.
Keeler and Cretin claim that using different discount rates for
attributes can cause indefinite postponement of projects. 2 8 If health
care has a lower discount rate than money, then delaying by a year will
make a project more cost effective. They claim that this results in no
project's ever being adopted. Ganiats notes that, when choosing projects
to implement, society looks at cost effectiveness. 2 9 A project cost
effective this year will be implemented, even if it would be moreso next
year. Therefore, cost effective projects can be implemented even if
different discount rates are used for the attributes of the project.
IncorrectAssumptions
Kula points out the false assumptions which conventional
30
discounting is based upon:
* People live forever, or society is one being with an
eternal life;
* People do not die before the end of a project; and
* It is acceptable to discriminate against future
generations, by valuing them less.
26 See G. Schieber & J. Poullier, InternationalHealth Care Expenditure Trends, 8
Health Aff. 169 (1989); see also W. Kip Viscusi, Risk-Risk Analysis, 8 J. of Risk and
Uncertainty 5 (1994).
27 See Peter Nijkamp et al., Multiple Futures and Multiple Discount Rates in
Multiple CriteriaAnalysis, 4 Project Appraisal 1 (1989).
28 See Keeler & Cretin, supra note 3.
29 See Theodore Ganiats, Discounting in Cost Effectiveness Research, 14 Med.
Decision Making 298 (1994).
30 See Erhun Kula, Time Discounting and Future Generations (1997).
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People alive at the beginning of many projects will die before they
end. Nuclear waste must be stored thousands of years, and such facts
are not taken into account in conventional discounting methods,
making them unsound. The question about whether it is permissible to
devalue future generations is discussed above, and the evidence shows
unjust situations. These issues undermine the validity of the
conventional discounting methods.
Psychological Research
Discounting the future and adopting the particular discount rates
adopted have sometimes been justified by observation of human
decisions. It has been argued that the future should be discounted on
the basis of society's time preference. Psychological research has been
carried out to investigate how people discount various commodities
over time and what affects their discount rate. Benzion et al. and Thaler
31
found that:
• Small outcomes have higher discount rates than larger
outcomes;
* Discount rates are higher for gains than for losses;
-People have very high discount rates for short time delays;
and
* Discount rates decrease with the time necessary to wait
for the outcome.
32
Ahlbrecht and Weber also cite evidence that:
* People want considerable compensation to delay a good
outcome and yet invest at low interest rates; and
* People prefer small immediate outcomes to larger
delayed ones.
Cognitive theories claim that these occur because people are averse to
waiting and fail to picture the future adequately. The research shows
that discount rates depend on the context and framing of the
33
decision.
31 See Uri Benzion et al., Discount Rates Inferred from Decisions: An
Experimental Study, 35 Mgmt. Sci. 270 (1989); see also Richard Thaler, Some
Empirical Evidence on Dynamic Inconsistency, 8 Econ. Letters 201 (1981).
32 See Martin Ahlbrecht & Martin Weber, Hyperbolic Discount Models in
Prescriptive Theories of Intertemporal Choice, 115 Zeitschrift fur WirtschaftsSozialwissenschaften 535 (1995).
33 For more detailed discussions of the issues in intertemporal contexts; see George
Loewenstein & Drazen Prelec, Anomalies in Intertemporal Choice: Evidence and an
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According to normative theories of intertemporal choice, discount
factors are and should be constant. Non-constant discount rates violate
the stationarity axiom of Discounted Utility Theory (DUT). The
axiom states that the preference for two outcomes is independent of the
time when the outcomes are evaluated. The preference should,
therefore, depend only on the absolute time difference between the
outcomes. Behavioural research has shown that discount rates depend
on the time until the outcome. 34 People often have discount rates that
decrease as the time to the outcome increases. There are persuasive
reasons why discount rates should depend on the timing of the
outcomes. 3 5 Hyperbolic discount models have discount rates that
change over time and allow decision makers to give more weight to the
36
very long term future.
The situation that applies to individuals is very different from that
facing society as a whole. Individuals are finite and have a short life span
relative to the human race. Society as a whole (it is hoped) will last for
much longer and the risks it faces are very different. Thus, it does not
seem logical to use personal discount rates for valuing societal decisions.
Dynamic Consistency and Stationarity
There are two points in time that need to be considered when
thinking about decisions which have consequences in the future:
* When the preferences are stated and the decision made;
and
0 When the outcome occurs.
For stationarity to hold, the trade-off between two periods must
only depend on the temporal distance between them. This means that a
constant discount factor should be applied, regardless of whether the
periods are close to the present or a long way in the future (assuming
that preferences about the future are stated now). Non-constant
discount rates do not obey stationarity.
Interpretation, 107 Q. J. of Econ. 573 (1992); Elizabeth Atherton & Simon French,
Issues in
porting Intertemporal Choice, in Essays in Decision Making 135 (Mark
Karwan et al. eds., 1997).
34 See Benzion et al., supra note 31; see also Ahlbrecht & Weber, supra note 31.
35 See Simon French, Decision Theory: An Introduction to the Mathematics of
Rationality (1986); see also Atherton & French, supra note 32.
36 See Charles Harvey, ProportionalDiscounting of Future Costs and Benefits, 20
Mathematics of Operational Res. 381 (1995).
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Dynamic consistency requires that decision makers know their
future preferences today. The ranking of outcomes should not depend
on when the assessment takes place or how close the outcome is to
occurring. As people and their circumstances change over time, this
may not be feasible or even desirable.
Varying discount rates can lead to a violation of dynamic
consistency, meaning that decisions will depend upon when they were
made, even if in all other respects the situation was identical. If a
constant discount rate is used, options are ranked in the same order,
independent of whether they are evaluated now or any time in the
future. If a non-constant discount rate is used, then relative and
absolute time changes do not always give the same rankings of the
options. If options are evaluated at a future date, then their rankings
may change.
Ahlbrecht and Weber discuss what conditions must hold for
dynamic consistency and stationarity to be equivalent. 3 7 If decisions
are binding, then dynamic consistency and stationarity are not
equivalent, and dynamic consistency arguments are inappropriate.
Therefore, stationarity is not a requirement of rationality. This is the
case in many decision situations, e.g., where to build a nuclear power
plant and where the decision is irreversible and will not be re-evaluated
in the future. This emphasizes that the choice about whether to use
constant or non-constant discounting should depend on the decision
makers' time preference and the decision being made. It would seem
unreasonable to use constant discounting if it does not reflect the
decision makers' preferences and if stationarity is not an issue.
Affinity to Time Frames
People's Affinity to Different Time Periods
Now
1 - 25 yrs
26 - 50 yrs
51 - 100 yrs
101 - 500 yrs
501 - 1000 yrs
1001 - 5000 yrs

Very imminent and imaginable
Affects the decision maker & their children
Affects decision maker's children & grandchildren
Affects grandchildren & great grandchildren
Some distant descendants
World will have changed dramatically
Will human race still be around?

37 See Ahlbrecht & Weber, supra note 32.

Very important
Important

Not that important

Atherton: Discounting to Incorporating Decisions 139

As shown above, the importance decision makers place on the future
dwindles as they have fewer relations with people they know still living.
People also tend to section the future, giving less thought to the long
term. For example, they may have clear plans for today, aims for the
week and then more general goals for the month. Atherton and French
38
asked subjects to section a thousand years into distinct eras. Most of
the subjects divided time into eras of increasing length and gave less
weight to the long term future, though more than is advocated by
constant discounting.
Loewenstein found that people value the present more than any
other time in history. 39 In light of this and the fact that people tend to
discount hyperbolically, it seems logical that the evaluation of attributes
and alternatives is time dependent. If this reflects the decision makers'
time preference, then the discount rate should change over time.
Technological developments have a large effect on the outcomes of
decisions. Technology is developing at a faster rate than ever before and
it is difficult to predict what will happen in the future. The more
remote an outcome is, the more uncertain we are about its effects. This
needs to be taken into account when modelling decisions.
People are sometimes less concerned about the future because they
cannot imagine what it will be like and feel very distant from it.
However, the political climate is changing because environmental
groups are encouraging people to be more long term focused and to
think about the effects of their actions on future generations. Although
people may still disregard the latter years of their lives, for example by
smoking, they are becoming more concerned about the long term
effects of their actions on society and future generations. As people
become more aware of the long term consequences of their actions,
they will want to take them into account in their decision making.
Discounting Models
Discounting models have been developed in several research
disciplines. Normative models say "how" the future should be valued,
38 See Elizabeth Atherton & Simon French, Should We Discount Discounting in
Long Term Projects, in Working Paper (1999).
39 See George Loewenstein, Anticipation and Valuation of Delayed Consumption,
97 The Econ. J. 666 (1987).
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while descriptive models try to predict and model human behavior. In
the following sections, three particular models are compared with
comments made on their appropriateness for long term intertemporal
decisions.
In DUT, the value of an outcome stream (x1, x2, .... xn) is:
V(x,x 2 ,x3 ,...x n ) = x 1 + dx 2 + d2x 3 +... + dn-lx

Where d is the discount function such that d-

(1)

(2)

(l+r)

and r is the discount rate.
Harvey suggests a varying discount rate which could 'devalue the
rate. 40
future' at a much slower
3
(7,bY 3)rb
b r +(b r
V(x1 ,x 2 , .. .Xn)=(*

i

X2 + ++

J X3**

+( bnJ

(3

Where b > 0 is the temporal mid-value, i.e., the point in the future
assigned half the value of the present; and -00 < r < oo reflects how the

ratio of the outcomes is related to the ratio of the time effects. As time
tends to infinity, expression (3) decays to 0 more slowly than (1) and,
therefore, gives relatively more importance to long-term outcomes. The
model looks at the ratio between time periods, not absolute differences.
Harvey's model offers two ways of determining b. Harvey
advocates that decision makers state their temporal mid-value. He
claims that this encourages them to think about the whole lifetime of
the project. Alternatively, decision makers can be asked to give a
discount rate d, then b = 11d.
The factor r is obtained by analyzing how the ratio of outcomes is
related to the ratio of time trade-offs. If the outcomes have the same
ratio as their indifferent extra weighting times, r = 0 . In this case, the
time weights are:
a(t)= +t

(4)

The model, then called a Proportional Discounting Model, is used in
this paper.
Kula created what he calls the Modified Discount Model
(MDM).41 This, he claims, gives far more weight to the future. The
40 See Harvey, supra note 36.
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theory is based on the idea of using cohorts (the people born each year)
to determine the weight that should be given to the future. The
function has two parts: one that looks at those who are alive before the
project starts and one that looks at those who are born after the project
starts. The value given to people already living is discounted to the start
of the project, while the value given to people who are born after the
project begins is discounted to their year of birth.
42
The method is based on the following assumptions for the U.K.:
* The population size is a constant;
* The life expectancy of the population is 73;
* There are the same number of people in each generation;
* The number of births equals the number of deaths each
year; and
* Benefits are shared equally between all generations.
The first assumption, although true for developed countries, may
not be true for developing countries whose population sizes are often
increasing at a very fast rate. In many developed countries, life
expectancy is increasing, people are tending to live longer, and then
deteriorating very quickly at the end of their lives. This is changing the
demands made on health care and the distribution of health care over
people's lives. (However, this is not taken into account in the model).
Assuming that each age group consists of the same number of people is
slightly dubious; however, Kula does point out that the parameters in
the model can be changed to give more weight to certain generations, if
they have more people in them. The assumption about births and
deaths will depend on whether the country is developed or not. The
final assumption is dependant on the project and a weighting factor
could be introduced if it is not true.
The model mixes normative and descriptive assumptions together.
The discussion about the principle of value judgments with regards the
future is normative, but the assumption about life expectancy is
descriptive. Some of the descriptive assumptions put very tight
constraints on the population growth model that are not necessarily
41 See Erhun Kula, Future Generations and Discounting Rules in Public Sector
ProjectAppraisal,13 Envtl. Plan. A 899 (1981).

2 See Erhun Kula, Discount Factorsfor Public Sector Investment Projects Using
the Sum of Discounted Consumption Flows

-

Estimates for the United Kingdom,

16 Envtl. Plan.A 689 (1984).
11 Risk. Health, Safety & Environment 125 [Spring 2000]

true. If the assumptions are weakened, they can give an unrealistic
population model pattern. Separating the normative and descriptive
elements of the model may improve its validity.
The function is shown below:
I [ 1t 1
t]
5

1= ((1+s)t]

where n is the life expectancy of the population; s is the social
discount rate; and t is the age of the project.
Kula suggests that the social discount rate should be based on the
social time preference rate, also known as the consumption rate of
investment. This measure is based on:
" A mortality based pure time discount rate;
d The growth rate of per capita consumption in real terms;
and
r The elasticity of marginal utility of consumption.
See Kula for the derivation of the consumption rate of investment for
the United Kingdom which he estimates to be about 2.6%. 4 3 In the
following analysis, a rate of 3% is used. Yaffey has investigated the
validity of Kula's assumptions for the United Kingdom and the effect
on the model of changing them. 44 He points out that:
0 There are different numbers of people in each cohort
group;
* The age of death does not equal 73 for everyone; and
* The population is not stable, but decreasing.
Among existing cohorts, the perturbations do not matter because
the age distribution does not affect the weights. Similarly, any decrease
in total population size does not affect unborn cohorts because it is the
relative sizes of the groups that matter. Yaffey adjusted the cohort
weights to reflect the differences in cohort groups. He found that the
final discount function was not significantly different from the one
43 See Erhun Kula, Social Interest Rate for Public Sector Appraisal in the United
Kingdom, the United States and Canada,2 Project Appraisal 169 (1987).
44 See Michael Yaffey, Modified Discount Model Revisited, 12 Project Appraisal
79 (1997).
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given by Kula. Therefore, Kula's assumptions seem to be adequate for
the United Kingdom.
Bellinger has proposed a Multi-generational Value Formula that is
similar to Kula's MDM, but allows decision makers to apply different
discount rates to intra and intergenerational issues. 4 5 He also points
out the importance of the type of good being analysed and the effect
this should have on its discount rate.
Kula's MDM has been criticized by several authors. Price argues
that MDM gives inconsistent results when decisions are reviewed at a
later date.4 6 As discussed in the section on dynamic consistency, this is
only important if the decision is reversible and will be re-evaluated in
the future. This is not an issue in the context we are considering. Price
also states that a low discount rate should be used for long term
projects, rather than modifying the discounting method. This can still
be unreasonable when the decision spans hundreds of thousands of
years. In such cases, Price advocates not discounting at all. This,
however, means assuming that there is no trade-off between the present
and the future, which is clearly untrue.
Thomson argues that decision makers must bow to pressure from
present generations who he claims want to discount the future.4 7 He
says that they want benefits now, but not the costs. Atherton and
French, show that even though people may discount the future, the rate
used is sometimes far less than that advocated by constant discounting
and people want to take the future into account in their decision
48
making.
As has been noted, after the project year reaches the life expectancy
of the population, the discount rate does not decrease. Bateman
questions the implications of this. 49 He says this implies that after a
45 See William Bellinger, Incorporating the Future Multigenerational Value:
Modifying the Modified Discounting Method, 6 Project Appraisal 101 (1991).
46 See Colin Price, Equity, Consistency, Efficiency and New Rules for
Discounting,4 Project Appraisal 58 (1989).
47 See K. Thomson, Future Generations: The Modified Discounting Method
A Reply, 3 Project Appraisal 171 (1988).
48 See Elizabeth Atherton & Simon French, Valuing the Future: An Application
of Hyperbolic Discounting with Time Era Weights, 4 Risk Decision and Pol'y 1
(1999); see also Atherton & French, supra note 38.
49 See Ian Bateman, The Modified Discounting Method: Some Comments, 4
Project Appraisal 104 (1989).
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certain point in time, it is the size of an outcome that matters, and not
when it occurs. This may be true for very long time frames, e.g., after a
thousand years, but it is unclear whether this is true for shorter ones. In
Kula's model, this would happen after 73 years for the United
Kingdom.
Another possibility is to combine the Harvey model with the Kula
model. A hyperbolic discount function would be used instead of a
constant discounting function in Kula's model. This would give a social
discount function that decreases more slowly over time.
The graph below shows how the different discount functions change
over time. A discount rate of 5% is used, in line with general
government policy. This means that in the proportional discounting
model b is 20. The graph indicates that the modified hyperbolic
discount model gives more weight to the future throughout the life of a
project. It is clear that the constant discounting model tends to zero
very quickly and so gives very little weight to the future.
Graph 1
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Below, Table 1 shows that, with constant discounting, very little
weight is given to events only 50 years into the future. With the
proportional discount model, more weight is given to the long term
future, but this is still negligible after 200 years or so. The proportional
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discount model gives more weight to the short term than either the
modified discount model or the constant discount model. However,
after 50 years, the modified discount model gives more weight to
events than the proportional discount model. The modified hyperbolic
model gives the most weight to the future at all times. With the
modified discount model and the modified hyperbolic model, all the
years after the estimated life expectancy of the population (in this case
73) are given the same weight. This means that the long term future is
given far more weight than with the other two models.
Compared to the standard modified discounting method,
modified hyperbolic discounting decreases the value given to the future
more slowly. The underlying discount function also reflects more
accurately the way that people discount future events. 5 0 The weight
given to the long term future is also higher when the modified
hyperbolic discounting method is used.
Table 1
The Values Given to the Future by the Discount Functions
Year

Constant 5%

5
10
50
100
200
500

0.784
0.614
0.0872
0.0076
0
0

Proportional5%

0.8
0.667
0.286
0.167
0.091
0.039

Modified 5%
Hyperbolic 5%
0.789
0.6356
0.2776
0.266
0.266
0.266

Modified

0.805
0.684
0.428
0.413
0.413
0.413

With constant and modified discounting, the decision maker only
has to define the discount rate. The range of justifiable values for the
discount rate is limited; the value used is usually the market interest
rate or the social rate of time preference taken from studies. The
proportional discount model gives decision makers more scope. They
can define the discount rate by defining their temporal mid-value.
This means that they can use much lower discount rates. All three
methods, however, limit decision makers to valuing the future less than
they value the present. They are confined to decreasing future values.

50 See Ahlbrecht & Weber, supra note 32.
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Time Eras and Time Era Weights
An alternative method might be to use time era weights or give
time era a weight to reflect its importance. This would allow decision
makers to increase the weight they give to the future. They could also
specify values which increase over time. The rate of decrease is also
more under the decision makers' control. They can define weights that
decrease quickly at first and then level out or which do not decrease at
all. The discount values could, therefore, match the decision makers'
preferences exactly and would not tie them to a set of values that they
did not necessarily agree with.
If we think, for example, about a cost that is incurred during every
year of a project, then it could be viewed as n separate attributes, one
for each year. Figure 1 shows this diagrammatically in the form of an
attribute tree.
Figure 1
Attribute Tree for Costs Sectioned Into Years
Project

S I I
1st
yr.

2nd
yr.

3rd
yr.

I
4th
yr.

I
4999th 5000th
yr.
yr.

This is not very intuitive, so the question is how to rearrange the
attribute tree so that it is. It would be difficult to think about year
4999, for example, and to attach an importance weight to that year.
Using a constant discount rate prevents decision makers from having to
make such difficult valuations. However, it limits how people can value
the future, tying them into giving the future less weight than the
present, which may not be what they want to do.
Grouping the years into time eras may be more appealing to decision
makers. Instead of having to think about individual years, they are
required to think about groups of years and have to attach a value
weight to each group of years. The attribute tree would then become
what is shown below in Figure 2.
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Figure 2
Attribute Tree for Costs Sectioned Into Time Eras
Project
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The time eras could be determined according to several different
factors, e.g., the affinity of the decision makers to the different eras,
changes in attributes or their values, or changes in the probability of the
scenarios. Once defined, it is relatively easy to elicit decision makers'
opinions about the importance of these eras. Structuring decisions in
this way could help decision makers:
* Understand their situation better;
* Express their opinions;
* Allow attributes, their values, relative weights and the
uncertainty surrounding them to change over time;
* Highlight the trade-offs that have to be made over time;
and
* Focus attention on the long term aspects of a decision.
It would also give them the ability to give more value to the long
term future of their projects. If their opinions and preferences were in
line with the axioms underpinning constant discounting, then a
constant discount rate could be used and the time eras could be used
purely for modelling purposes. If, however, the decision makers'
opinions do not conform to the constant discounting axioms, then they
could use another discounting model, e.g., the hyperbolic model or
even the time era weights idea suggested.
The application of the new structuring and the idea of time era
weights have been investigated in several situations. 5 1 These
experiments showed that the structuring was intuitive to the subjects
and helped them to express the motivations behind their opinions.
51 See Elizabeth Atherton & Simon French, Valuing the Future: A MADA
Example Involving Nuclear Waste Storage, 7 J. of Multi-Criteria Decision Analysis
304 (1998); see Atherton & French, supra note 48; see Atherton & French, supra
note 38.
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Most of the subjects were motivated by one of the following issues:
* Affinity to the people living in different eras;
* Obligations to the future;
* Developments in technology; and
* Increased uncertainty relating to future events.
The first two are value judgments, while the last two are related to
the subjects' perceptions of the future. Using time era weights helped
the subjects focus on these issues. The subjects wanted to give more
weight to the future than is prescribed by exponential discounting, even
with a very low discount rate. This may indicate that using time era
weights and including time explicitly in the attribute tree helped the
subjects to focus on the long term issues in the decision. The weights
given by the subjects were closer to hyperbolic curves than exponential
curves. Some gave equal and increasing weights to the future.
Conclusion
This paper has discussed some of the issues surrounding the tradeoffs to be considered in intertemporal decision making. The validity of
the arguments put forward for discounting the future have been
investigated with respect to very long term decisions involving society,
and they do not appear to be valid. Several models for valuing the
future have been examined and a new way of structuring and valuing
attributes over time has been presented, along with some of the
advantages this may give.
The idea of time era weights could be used in two ways that
emphasize their flexibility and use as a discussion motivator and/or
modelling tool. Both uses will help with the structuring and modelling
of long term decisions.
First, the weights given by the decision makers could be fitted to
one of the discount functions outlined earlier. This function could then
be used to value the future in the model. Using time era weights
initially would help the decision makers consider the trade-offs they
have to make in the project and express their opinions before searching
for a specific discount function, be that exponential, hyperbolic, Kula's
function, or any other. The discount function used would be the one
that matched the decision makers opinions most accurately.
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Second, time era weights could be used instead of a discount
function. In this case, the weights used in the model would match the
decision makers' preferences exactly. Using time era weights does not
restrict decision makers to giving the future less weight than the
present, unlike other value functions. The decision makers could give
the time eras equal or increasing weights, if they so desired.
Policy makers should take into account the fact that the public
wants to look at the long term impacts of projects when making societal
decisions. The public is demanding more democratic decision making
processes that involve them and take their opinions into account. They
are becoming more environmentally aware and have greater concern
about the long term impacts of decisions than ever before. This
highlights the need to find more inclusive decision-making processes.
The use of time era weights may provide a way of helping decision
makers discuss the time trade-offs they have to make. Using time era
weights makes the trade-offs explicit and enables decision makers to see
which parts of the decision change over time. Instead of focusing on the
search for a discount rate, the methodology allows decision makers to
discuss what is motivating their opinions and explore common
understandings.
Societal decisions often have long term impacts; those involving
nuclear waste or the environment can have consequences which span
over hundreds of thousands of years. Decision makers need to consider
all the impacts of the decision they make. However, using a constant
discount rate disregards the long term future, giving virtually no
importance to events that occur after the first 50 years. This is not
defendable behaviour, especially with projects that span hundreds or
thousands of years, and it is important to find alternative ways of
modelling decisions, so that these outcomes are taken into account.
Models should only be used if they reflect the decision makers'
opinions and capture the situation adequately. In addition, more
research needs to be carried out to find suitable modelling techniques
for long term decisions.
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